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 Among contemporary social scientists there are two central
questions that have been frequently raised. First, is social inquiry scientific
or philosophical? Second, is understanding others possible? In attempting
to answer the first question, some may say that all kinds of social inquiry
are scientific because they are empirical and can be measured by scientific
methods or empirical approaches. Others may say that social inquiry is
philosophical in kind because it deals with human beings and cannot
escape from normative approaches. Still, others  may say that it is both
scientific and philosophical in the sense that it can be described in terms
of both causal theories and intentionality. Still, others may say that social
inquiry is neither scientific nor philosophical in the sense that it does not
deal with “theoretical rationality.” They may argue that it is phronetic
in the sense that it deals with “practical rationality.” However, this first
question is not the main concern of this paper. In this paper I will inquire
into the second question together with the concept of rationality.
I.  What  Rationality  Means
“Rationality” seems to be one of the most confusing philosophical
concepts. It can mean different things to different people. In order not to
get lost, we may study it through the long history of its usage, especially
from great philosophers. We may date this back to Aristotle who first
made a distinction between theoria (theoretical rationality) and phronesis
(practical rationality). Kant followed this distinction and developed more
in his Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason.
Aristotle, Kant, Descartes, and other great philosophers considered reason
as something “given” to human beings only, not to other kinds of animals.
However, even though reason is believed “given” and considered central
to the conception of human being, everybody must have resolution and
courage to use it in order to reach maturity. Kant defines the meaning of
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the Enlightenment with the Horatian motto, Sapere Aude, “Think for
yourself.” As he puts it,
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred
immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own
understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity
is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack
of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another.
The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have
courage to use your own understanding!1
            Richard Rorty (1992) explores various meanings of rationality.
First, rationality can mean capability of self-adjustment. Rationality of
this kind belongs to both man and animal. Second, rationality may mean
tolerance which is a moral virtue or qualification which can be acquired
through practice. Rationality of this kind is an ability to live among
differences without prejudices. Third, rationality may mean special faculty
given to man only. Rationality of this kind is believed immortal, namely,
it remains to exist even though a man dies.2 Harold Brown (1990) also
makes a general survey of various concepts and models of rationality
from classical to what he calls “the new model.”3 However, in this paper
I will investigate two meanings of rationality: rationality as a potentiality
and as a virtue.
           First, rationality may be considered as a given potentiality to
establish certain goals and choose appropriate means to reach them. In
this sense, I will follow the model as proposed by Davidson and Rescher.
A rational action is one that stands in a certain relation to the agent’s
beliefs and desires, that is, their reasons for acting.4 For instance, if person
X has a desire to bring about goal B, and believes that action A is the
most effective means to goal B, then the person acts rationally if he/she
brings about action A for those reasons. To make it clear, we may illustrate
this by the following schema.
1. X has goal B.
X acts rationally if 2. X believes that action A leads to goal
B effectively.
3. X does action A.
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According to this model, we can see that rationality is related to
beliefs, desires and  individual actions.
           Second, rationality may be considered as a moral virtue, namely
an Aristotelian golden mean between the two extremes, namely scepticism
and credulity. An agent will be considered as a person of rationality if
and only if, after his or her profound reflection through praxis, it is neither
too hard  nor too easy for him or her to believe or deny things in question.
Rationality in this sense I follow the Lord Buddha in his Kalamasutta5
and Anthony Kenny who paraphrases Aristotle’s concept of moral virtue.6
Like all other moral virtues as proposed by Aristotle, rationality in this
sense can be acquired only through practice. Like courage, we never call
a person courageous if he or she never conducts brave deeds. In summary,
the difference between rationality as a potentiality and as a moral virtue
is that rationality as a potentiality is  “given” or “innate” whereas
rationality as a virtue is “acquired” or “learned.”
II. What Understanding Is
Understanding is one of the key concepts in human and social
sciences. Dilthey obviously makes a distinction between natural sciences
and human sciences7 (Geisteswissenschaften). He well recognizes that
Kant did a good job on providing a critique of pure reason to demonstrate
how natural sciences are possible. Thus Dilthey aims at providing a
critique of historical reason to show how human sciences are possible. In
other words, while Kant develops epistemology as the foundation of
natural sciences, Dilthey develops hermeneutics as the foundation of
human sciences. Epistemology deals with explanation, but hermeneutics
deals with understanding.
           What is understanding? In order to understand understanding, we
may compare human sciences with natural ones. Natural sciences, on
the one hand, try to explain natural events. Natural scientists use causal
laws and theories in their explanations. Thus one main task of natural
scientists is to discover scientific laws as Hempel put it,
To explain the phenomena of the physical world is one of the
primary objectives of the natural sciences. Indeed, almost all of
the scientific investigations… were aimed not at ascertaining
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some particular fact but at achieving some explanatory insight…
Explanatory accounts of this kind will be called explanations by
deductive subsumptions under general laws, or deductive-
nomological explanations. The laws invoked in a scientific
explanation will also be called covering laws for the explanandum
phenemenon, and the explanatory arguments will be said to
subsume the explanandum under those laws.8
Once scientific laws are discovered, they will be used to explain
natural happenings. To understand or explain natural events, we do not
need to know their history. Hempel’s D-N Schema is demonstrated as a
model of scientific explanation. It may be shown as follows:
C1,        C2 …       Ck         Antecedents (Causes)
L1,         L2…         Lr         Laws
________________
E                                         Consequents (Effects)
Since scientific explanations are based on laws, we may say that
natural sciences are based on nomologicalism. Human sciences, on the
other hand, try to understand human actions in their inquiry. It may be
asked, “What are human actions?” “Are they different from natural
events?” “If so, how are they different?” To give answers to these
questions, we should turn our interests to our own actions first. When we
have a retreat, we usually ask ourselves with these questions: “Who are
we?” “Where are we from?” “Where are we now?” “Are we satisfied
with our present position?” “What have we done?” “What should we do
next?” “What are our goals?” “What is our ultimate goal?” and so on.
No matter whoever we are, these questions will inevitably lead us to
ends and means. Let’s say for example, X is a businessman who has a
retreat every quarter. His strategy is somewhat under a cycle of “plan,
do, check and improve,” and this cycle deals inevitably with ends, means
and established time. We can say that  X’s actions are always purposive
and intentional. X understands his actions in terms of ends and means
126  Prajñâ Vihâra
through time. A question that can be raised here is: Are X’s actions natural
movements? Surely, we will say yes to this question. X’s actions as natural
events ,like other natural happenings, may be explained by causal laws
or theories which transcend all different cultures and civilizations. But
human actions are not only natural events but also intentional happenings.
As natural events human actions can be explained by causal laws or
theories from kinetic and potential energy to gravity, so in this sense they
are based on nomologicalism. As intentional happenings they must be
explained in terms of ends and means through history and time; therefore,
they are based on historicism. Suppose we see two boys standing thirty
meters ahead. We see one boy handing a five-dollar note to another. In
terms of nomologicalism, we can explain their movements by causal laws,
but deductive-nomological explanations are not sufficient for us to
understand their behavior. We do not know whether the boy pays his
debt or lends his money or gives his money to another for free or something
else. We can understand their behavior only through historicism. Hence
Dilthey is right when he wrote, “No doubt the human studies have the
advantage over the physical sciences because their subject is not merely
an appearance given to the senses, a mere reflection in the mind of some
outer reality, but inner reality directly experienced in all its complexity.”9
III.  The  Possibility  of  Understanding  Others
It is obvious that one never asks whether understanding oneself
is possible. We do not doubt or ask ourselves about the possibility of
self-consciousness because we can reach this “inner reality” directly. We
are the only ones who actually have our own consciousness or mental
states. Nobody else can ever reach, steal or take away our mental states.
As Fay put it, “Mental phenomena are invisible; they take place ‘inside’
where no one else can go. Philosophers have described all of this by
saying that each person has privileged access to his or her own mental
states and processes.10 We can understand our own deeds with regard to
our desires and beliefs. We know our own reasons directly why we do
such and such deeds. Thus a question to be raised here is not about self-
understanding but about the possibility of understanding others.(1) Is
understanding others possible? All sceptics will say no to this question,
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and, therefore, they do not need to answer the next question: (2) How is
understanding others possible? But for those who say yes to question
(1), they need to give an answer to question (2).
          It is true that all of our sense experiences and mental states are
private or personal. All sensations and feelings belong to the consciousness
of each particular person. However, since we are by nature social animals,
we need to understand and communicate with others. Often we do want
to share what we see or feel with others, and often want others to share
what they feel or see with us. In other words, as social animals, we want
to understand others , and we want others to understand us. How can we
share our private mental states with others? In other words, how can we
communicate our inner feelings with them?   To communicate our private
feelings and sensations with others we need to have intersubjective media
such as concepts, models, signs, symbols, metaphors, and the like. It is
obvious that people who belong to the same community that shares a
“language game” under the same “form of life” can understand and
communicate with one another through the concepts and models used in
their community. As we all know, sometimes misunderstandings can
happen, but they can be usually solved. Thus it is easy to say yes to
question (1) if “others” mean members of the same community. To answer
question (2) is also not so difficult if “others” mean people in the same
culture or civilization. As human beings or to use Heidegger’s term
Dasein , we are always “thrown” into some certain form of life on earth.
We have been formed by socio-cultural beliefs, norms and practices
through our own traditions. If X, for instance, was born a Thai, he would
know what “wai” means, and he would know how to “wai” different
people in different ways. Thus it is not difficult for X as a Thai to
understand the behaviors of the Thai people in general. It seems difficult,
if not impossible, for us to understand and communicate with others or
those who live in cultures or civilizations different from our own. The
only way to understand others who live in different cultures or civilizations
seems to be what Quine and Davidson called “radical translation” or
“radical interpretation.” How is it possible?
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IV.  How  Is  Understanding  Others  in  Different  Cultures  Possible?
In his book Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation Davidson
argues that there are no such things as incommensurable human cultures.
When we confront the task of  translating the language, hitherto unknown,
of another culture, we should proceed according to the Principle of
Charity which asserts that:
1. Most of the doings and sayings of the people whose language
is being translated are rational.
2. Most of the beliefs of those people are consistent and true by
our standards.
3. Their beliefs and desires are largely similar to ours.
Since human actions express beliefs and desires, to determine
the meaning of an act we must determine the relevant beliefs and desires
behind it. How can this be done? Davidson asserts that only by assuming
that other people in different cultures and civilizations are rational like
us in the sense that their beliefs and desires are connected in the ways we
connect them, and only by assuming that most of their beliefs are true by
our own standards. Davidson wrote,
The methodological advice to interpret in a way that optimizes
agreement should not be conceived as resting on a charitable
assumption about human intelligence that might turn out to be
false. If we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other
behavior of a creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely
consistent and true by our own standards, we have no reason to
count the creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying
anything.11
         Davidson’s assumptions seem to endorse the thesis of provincialism
which holds that “Everyone is just like us.” The provincialist thesis is
opposite to that of multiculturalism which holds that “Everyone is just
different from us.” Relativists adopt the multiculturalist thesis and deny
the provincialist one. Thus they will disagree with Davidson’s
assumptions. Cultural relativism typically holds that “(1) norms of
rationality differ across cultures; that (2) judgments of the rationality of
a given action are relative to the governing norms of the local particular
culture; such that (3) two people, depending on their cultural locations,
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might disagree about the rationality of the same action, one judging it to
be rational and the other irrational, and both judgments would be equally
correct.”12 We can use two main models to support the assumptions of
cultural relativism: (1) Wittgenstein’s model of language games and forms
of life and (2) Kuhn’s model of incommensurability. According to the
later Wittgenstein’s work, we may summarize that: (1) all language games
which belong to certain forms of life have a logic of their own; that (2)
each form of life has its own criteria and sets its own norms of intelligibility
and rationality; and that (3) words have their meaning only in the contexts
of these different language games. Thus if Wittgenstein’s assumptions
are correct, namely, if other cultures do have very different cultural norms
and criteria, we have to try to understand them in their own terms.
According to Wittgenstein, it is nonsensical for us to try to impose our
categories and criteria on other different cultures.13 It is ridiculous if we
try to use basketball rules to judge soccer, and vice versa. Therefore, we
should keep basketball rules to judge basketball matches, and soccer
rules for soccer games. There are no such things as neutral rules which
are applicable to all different games. Davidson goes too far when he
asserts that most beliefs of the people in different cultures are consistent
and true by our own standards. In fact, our own standards must be used
in our own contexts only. There is no such medicine that can cure all
kinds of diseases. This is what Kuhn calls “incommensurability.” We
may paraphrase Kuhn that one culture and another are incommensurate
because they are completely non-translatable into one another. However,
this also goes too far.14
         In fact, Davidson’s assumptions are not all wrong. It will be all
right if he asserts that most of the beliefs of the people in different cultures
are consistent and true in their own contexts.15 I agree with him that
radical translation or interpretation is possible only if we assume that
other people in different cultures are rational like us in the sense that
their beliefs and desires are connected in the way we connect them. If all
people are not rational in this sense, how can we understand and
communicate with them? All people know how to set certain goals and
choose proper means to achieve them. All people are given a potentiality
to do so since they were born. However, even though all human beings
are similar in this aspect, they are different in another. Any extreme ideas
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seem to be improper and misleading. Let us consider the theses of
provincialism and multiculturalism as mentioned above. Both theses are
false because they are extreme. To correct these extremes, we should say,
“Everyone is like us in some aspect and different from us in another.” If
we are alike in some aspect and different in another, then our cultures
will also be alike in some aspect and different in another. The similar
aspect is translatable, so it is commensurable. Only the different aspect
is non-translatable and, therefore, incommensurable. Thus we need to
understand others in their own terms only in those non-translatable
domains.
V.  Beyond  Natural  and  Human  Sciences:  From  Rationality  to
Agape
According to all scientific positivists, on the one hand, including
all schools of materialists and behaviorists, human actions and other
natural events are not different in kind. If all natural events can be
explained by causal laws and theories, then human actions, in principle,
also can be explained by causal laws and theories. Thus the main task of
all scientists is just try to discover those laws. If we are lucky in
discovering them, then we will be able to predict human actions as we do
with other natural events. According to human and social scientists, on
the other hand, human actions and other natural events are different in
degree, if not also in kind. Even though we are lucky in discovering
causal laws, they are not sufficient to make us understand human actions.
Since human actions are considered as both natural events and intentional
happenings, we need something more for understanding others. Surely,
we need causal laws to explain human actions as natural movements,
but we also need hermeneutical historicism to understand human actions
as intentional activities. In other words, according to the human/social
scientists, we need deductive-nomological explanations for the physical
aspect of human actions, and, simultaneously, we also need hermeneutics
for the mental/psychological aspect of human actions. If we can explain
the physical aspect and understand the mental aspect of human actions,
then there is nothing more for understanding others.
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Are natural and human sciences sufficient for understanding
others? My answer to this question is no. It is not wrong for the positivists
and the human/social scientists to search for causal laws and theories of
interpretation. It is their duties to do so, and they should be highly
encouraged and supported. But they are mistaken if they think that their
missions are sufficient for understanding others. Comte and the positivists
are wrong to equate (Western) modern science with rationality. In fact,
rationality belongs to all humankind in the sense that it is a potentiality
given to everyone. Moreover, every culture and civilization has its own
science which can be validly and soundly justified by its own norms and
criteria only. Thus rationality and science are not completely identical.
Rationality includes science, but not vice versa. Metaphorically speaking,
science is to rationality as metaphysics is to philosophy.
Do human beings have only the physical and mental dimensions?
No, there is still another dimension, namely, the spiritual dimension. This
dimension of man cannot be reached by natural and human sciences. It is
beyond both nomologicalism and historicism. In other words, it is beyond
rationality at the intellectual/cognitive level. It can be reached only
through religion and art, namely, through Truth and Beauty. Feyerabend
wrote,
…subjective events…are beyond the reach of the most
sophisticated physical or biological theory. However, they are
not beyond the reach of artists, painters, poets, writers of plays.
Now love, disappointment, desire play a large role in the lives of
people. They also play a role in the process of scientific
research…Hence, if you really want to understand the sciences
and not merely write dry and abstract fairytales about them –and
remember, by ‘understanding the sciences’ I mean both the context
of discovery and the context of justification-then you have to
turn to the arts and the humanities, i.e. you have to abandon these
artificial classifications most philosophies and ‘rational accounts’
are full of.16
         One of the main problems of the positivists and the human/social
scientists in understanding others is probably because they ignore the
meaning of understanding as sympathy and empathy on account of its
subjectivity. For them, if anything is subjective, it is not scientific or
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rational. This is their big mistake. In fact, in the world of knowledge, no
one can throw away their subjectivity from their epistemological
framework. That is the reason why Hawking once said, “Things are as
they are because we are.” As a matter of fact, subjective events play a
large role in our lives as Feyerabend put it above.
Comte and the positivists are also mistaken when assuming that
the spiritual / religious dimension is the lowest stage of human epistemic
development. Eastern people in general usually do consider an
“enlightened” person17 as the one who is truly in the highest position.
Metaphorically speaking, those who are not enlightened are at the bottom
or somewhere between the top and the bottom of the mountain, but those
who are enlightened are at the top. Thus the enlightened people can
transcend all the barriers and limitations. To use Nietzsche’s phrase, they
are “beyond good and evil.” There is a story about two monks. One day
two of them walked by a river. They met a girl crying by the river bank
because she could not swim across the river. One of the monk carried her
across the river. The other monk complained about this activity because
it is against a discipline: a monk should never touch any woman. He
kept on complaining until they reached their temple. The monk who
carried the girl, after he had kept silence all the way back to the temple,
finally said, “I laid her down quite a long time ago. Why have you been
still carrying her?” From the story, who should be considered as the
enlightened one? Enlightened people have no sin in their minds, so they
can transcend everything with their loving kindness and compassion. They
are beyond “good and evil,” “right and wrong,” “disciplined and
undisciplined,” “rational and irrational,” etc. They could do as Jesus
Christ said, “The Shabbath day is for man, not man for the Shabbath
day.”
We can observe in our daily lives that all kinds of love, no matter
they are eros, philia or agape, always help us transcend all the differences.
For example, if someone falls in love with a woman, his love will transcend
all her differences in race, color, nationality, religion and all her historical
background. His love can transcend everything in the sense that nothing
can prevent it. It is borderless and limitless. Similarly, if we love our
friends, no matter whom they are and where they are from, we will
certainly transcend all the differences. And for those who have heavenly
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love or agape, they can love even their enemies and be ready to help
them like the good Samaritan and Jesus Christ himself.
In summary, understanding others in terms of causal laws and
theories of interpretation is not sufficient because it is still under the game
of rationality and irrationality. To transcend this game and arrive at
authentic understanding we have no way except through loving kindness,
compassion and agape.
VI.  Conclusion
Understanding presupposes knowledge. We usually understand
and love those whom we know. Knowledge is a necessary condition for
love and understanding.  That is the reason why we need to support the
natural and the human/social scientists in their diverse missions.  Then
what is knowledge? Knowledge can mean different things. First,
knowledge may mean “being able to identify.” Second, it may mean
“being able to describe and explain.” Third, it may mean “having the
same experience as.”18 Knowledge from natural sciences and human/
social sciences can and do reach only “knowledge” as “being able to
identify” and as “being able to describe and explain.” It cannot come up
to “knowledge” as “having the same experience as” because “knowledge”
in the third sense can be arrived at only through practice. The scientists
usually ignore the third sense of knowledge because they think that it is
not relevant to their missions as Fay put it “…we understand others not
when we become them…, but only when we are able to translate what
they are experiencing or doing into terms which render them intelligible.
When Freud wished to understand the nightmares of the Rat Man, it was
not necessary that Freud have these nightmares himself…To know
someone else or even ourselves requires not the ability to psychologically
unite with them or ourselves at an earlier time but the ability to interpret
the meaning of the various states, relations, and processes which comprise
their or our lives.”19 It is true that it was not necessary for Freud to have
the nightmares himself in order to understand the nightmares of the Rat
Man if he was simply satisfied with his “intellectual” understanding.
But if Freud wants to reach “authentic” understanding, it is necessary
for him to have such nightmares. If the Lord Buddha had never
134  Prajñâ Vihâra
experienced suffering before, how could he have had authentic
understanding of the sufferings of other people and other creatures in the
cycle of life? To have “authentic” understanding is different from to have
“intellectual” understanding. Moreover, to have “authentic”
understanding is always something “more” than to have “intellectual”
understanding. That is the reason why Buddhadasa Bhikkhu once said,
“There is no salvation inside a university” because following the Way
and talking about following the Way are different things.  Understanding
others through causal laws is understanding at the physical level whereas
understanding others through human sciences is understanding at the
socio-psychological level. But both kinds of understanding are just
necessary conditions, not sufficient for authentic understanding. Then
how can we reach authentic understanding? Genuine or authentic
understanding can be acquired only at the spiritual level. There is no
way to reach authentic understanding  at the spiritual level except through
praxis with compassion, loving kindness and agape. Thus if rationality
is considered as a moral virtue, our rationality will come to the peak,
namely wisdom and enlightenment, only through practice at the spiritual
level.
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